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Abstract
Does nancial development exacerbate or dampen nancial am-
plication? This paper develops a macroeconomic model with the
borrowing constraint and heterogeneous agents to answer this ques-
tion. In our framework, nancial development produces two com-
peting forces. One is the e¤ect which accelerates amplication by
strengthening balance sheet e¤ects. The other is the e¤ect which re-
duces it, we call shock cushioning e¤ects. Whether nancial develop-
ment exacerbates or dampens amplication depends on the balance of
two e¤ects. We nd that the relation between nancial development
and amplication is non-monotone: amplication initially increases
with nancial development and later falls down.
Key Words: Non-Monotonicity, Balance sheet e¤ects, Shock cush-
ioning e¤ects, the borrowing constraint, heterogeneous agents
JEL Classication: E44, E32
1 Introduction
What are the e¤ects of the development of nancial markets on ampli-
cation over the business cycle? Traditional wisdom suggests that nancial
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development stabilizes the economy by providing various channels for risk di-
versication. According to this view, nancial innovation not only promotes
long-run economic growth by enhancing e¢ ciency in resource allocation, but
also it helps to cushion consumers and producers from the e¤ects of economic
shocks.1 This classical view seems to have been widely accepted. Indeed, sev-
eral empirical and quantitative studies support the positive role of nancial
development in reducing volatility (See Cecchetti et al, 2006; Dynan et al,
2006; Jerman and Quadrini, 2008).
However, the situation has begun to change dramatically since the out-
break of the credit crisis of 2007-08. A new perspective has emerged: nancial
development destabilizes the economy by accelerating nancial amplication.
Before the crisis, it was often pointed out that thanks to nancial innova-
tion, the leverage of borrowers increased, and this high leverage generated
economic booms. However, once the credit crisis occurred, people began to
state that such a high leverage could lead to signicant damages in borrowers
balance sheets, and eventually in the nancial system as a whole. Financial
development is suddenly blamed for increasing volatility. Indeed, IMF (2006,
2008) supports this new view by presenting empirical evidences that in more-
advanced nancial systems, the shock propagation e¤ects become stronger.2
Motivated by these conicting views, this paper theoretically investigates
whether nancial development accelerates or dampens nancial amplication
(macroeconomic volatility). To do so, we propose a macroeconomic model
with the borrowing constraint and heterogeneous agents. In our model, -
nancial development produces two competing forces. One is the e¤ect which
accelerates amplication by strengthening balance sheet e¤ects.3 The other
is the e¤ect which dampens amplication, we call shock cushioning e¤ects.
Depending on which of these dominates, whether nancial development ex-
acerbates or weakens nancial propagation is determined. Moreover, the
balance between these two conicting e¤ects changes according to the degree
of nancial development.
1Levine (1997), Beck et al. (2000) show empirically that nancial development causes
long-run economic growth. Castro et al. (2004) and Khan and Ravikumar (2001) exam-
ine the impact of nancial development including investor protection and risk-sharing on
growth theoretically as well as empirically or numerically.
2IMF reports argue that the sensitivity of real GDP growth rate, corporate investment,
household consumption, and residential investment response to equity busts, or business
cycles, is increasing in more market-based nancial systems.
3See Bernanke et al. (1996) for balance sheet e¤ects.
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Our main result shows that in a low level of nancial development, while
shock cushioning e¤ects do not work well, nancial development enhances
balance sheet e¤ects through raising leverage, thereby accelerating nancial
amplication. However, once the level of development passes a certain de-
gree, shock cushioning e¤ects are generated through an adjustment of the
interest rate, which in turn weakens balance sheet e¤ects, thereby dampening
nancial amplication. Hence, the relation between nancial development
and nancial amplication is non-monotone: nancial amplication initially
increases with nancial development and later falls down.
This paper is related to a number of researches on business cycle theory
which emphasize the role of credit market imperfections. Following the sem-
inal work by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
some researchers put nancial factors a central role in accounting for business
uctuations (See Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Kiyotaki 1998, ; Bernanke et
al., 1999; Kocherlakota, 2000; Cordoba and Ripoll, 2004). These studies
demonstrate how shocks are amplied through balance sheet e¤ects, assum-
ing a xed degree of nancial development. The contribution of our paper is
to examine how the sensitivity to the shocks changes as the degree of nancial
development changes.
Our paper is also related to Cooley et al. (2004), Rajan (2006), and
Shin (2009) with regard to the e¤ects of nancial development on ampli-
cation (volatility). Cooley et al. emphasize a negative relation between
the degree of contract enforceability, which corresponds to the degree of -
nancial development in our paper, and aggregate volatility. They show that
economies in which contracts are less enforceable display greater volatility
of output than economies with stronger enforceability of contracts. The pa-
per generates only a monotone relation. Our paper, however, generates a
non-monotone dependence of volatility from nancial development. Rajan
argues that nancial development has made the world better o¤, however
it can accentuate real uctuations, and economies may be more exposed to
nancial-sector-induced turmoil than in the past. However, Rajan does not
necessarily propose a formal model of how nancial development accelerates
nancial amplication. Shin presents a theoretical model where securitiza-
tion by itself may not enhance nancial stability. Our study shows within
one framework that nancial development initially accelerates amplication
and later reduces it.
Concerning this non-monotone relation between nancial development
and amplication, Aghion et al. (1999) and Matsuyama (2007, 2008) are
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related to ours. Aghion et al. show that volatility is low when the develop-
ment level is low or high. High volatility (cycles in their paper) occurs when
the level has an intermediated value. Our paper also shows that volatil-
ity is high when nancial development is an intermediated level. However,
the source of high volatility is di¤erent from their paper. In their model,
a change in the interest rate has a role in increasing volatility while in our
model, it has a role in reducing volatility.4 In our model, high volatility is
caused by balance sheet e¤ects with high leverage. Matsuyama develops a
model of the borrowing constraint with various types of heterogeneities in an
overlapping generations framework, and shows how it leads to a wide range
of non-monotone phenomena. In Matsuyamas model, the source of non-
monotonicity lies in the investment projects which do not produce capital
goods. Matsuyama shows that a better credit market might be more prone
to nancing those investment projects, and such a change in credit allocation
generates non-monotonicity. In our paper, the source of non-monotonicity
lies in the adjustment of the interest rate which yields shock cushioning ef-
fects.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. We analyze the dynamics and derive implications for the relationship
between nancial development and nancial amplication. Section 3 presents
conclusion.
2 The Model
The model is an extension of Kiyotaki (1998). Consider a discrete-time econ-
omy with two types of goods, consumption goods and capital goods and
two types of agents, entrepreneurs and workers. Let us start with the en-
trepreneurs, who are the central actors in the paper. At date t, a typical
entrepreneur has expected discounted utility:
E0
" 1X
t=0
t log ct
#
; (1)
4In Aghion et al., a rise (decline) in the interest rate during booms (recessions) in-
creases (reduces) debts repayment, which in turn produces recessions (booms). In this
way, endogenous cycles with high volatility occur.
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where ct is the consumption at date t, and  2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount
factor, and E0 [x] is the expected value of x conditional on information at
date 0.
Each entrepreneur can access investment projects to produce capital.
Every entrepreneur can access low protable investment projects, but only
some of the entrepreneurs, called H-entrepreneurs can access high protable
investment prejects. The rest of the entrepreneurs we call L-entrepreneurs.
The investment technology follows
kt+1 = 
izt; (2)
where zt is investment of goods at date t.  is the marginal productivity of
investment, and i 2 fH;Lg is the index for the marginal productivity of high
and low protable investment, respectively. kt+1 is capital produced at date
t + 1. We assume that capital depreciates fully after production. We also
assume H > L.
Each type of investment projects is associated with agency problems (Hart
and Moore (1994), Tirole (2006)). The entrepreneurs who undertake high
(low) protable investment projects can pledge only a fraction H (L) of
future returns from the investment. This fraction H or L can be collateral
in borrowing. We assume that H is less than L. That is, the degree of
agency frictions is less severe in low protable investment.
In addition, each entrepreneur knows his/her own type at date t of whether
or not he/she has high protable investment projects, but only knows it with
probability after date t + 1. That is, each entrepreneur shifts stochastically
between two states according to a Markov process: the state with high prof-
itable investment or the state without it. Specically, an entrepreneur who
has high (low) protable investment at date t may have high protable at
date t+ 1 with probability p (X(1  p)). This probability is exogenous, and
independent across entrepreneurs and over time. Assuming that the initial
ratio of the entrepreneurs who have high and only low protable investment
is X : 1, the population ratio is constant over time. We assume that the
probability is not too large:
Assumption : p > X(1  p): (3)
This assumption implies that there is a positive correlation between the
present period and the next period. That is, the entrepreneur who has high
protable investment in the current period continues to have it next period
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with higher probability than the one who has only low protable investment
in the current period.
The entrepreneurs ow of funds constraint is given by
ct + zt = qtkt   rt 1bt 1 + bt; (4)
where rt 1 and bt are the gross real interest rate, and the amount of bor-
rowing at date t  1 and t; respectively. qt is the relative price of capital to
consumption goods. The left hand side of (4) is expenditure: consumption
and investment. The right hand side is nancing: the returns from invest-
ment in the previous period minus debts repayment, which we call net worth
in this paper, and the amount of borrowing.
Because of the agency problems concerning the investment projects, the
entrepreneur faces the borrowing constraint.5 In such a situation, in order
for debt contracts to be credible, debts repayment does not exceed the value
of collateral. That is, the borrowing constraint becomes
rtbt  iqt+1izt: (5)
Here, without loss of generality, we assume that L is equal to one, and
dene H to be . The parameter  partly reects the legal structure and the
transaction costs in the liquidation of investment. In this sense,  provides a
simple measure of nancial development. In this paper, we dene an increase
in  as a nancial development.
Each entrepreneur chooses consumption, investment, capital, and borrow-
ing fct; zt; kt+1; btg to maximize the expected discounted utility (1) subject
to (2), (4), and (5).
Now, lets turn to the workers. There is only one type of workers. Each
worker is endowed with one unit of labor each period, and supplies it in-
elastically in the labor market. Workers do not have investment project to
produce capital, and therefore, do not have any collateral asset in order to
borrow. At date t, a typical worker has expected discounted utility:
E0
" 1X
t=0
0t log c0t
#
; (6)
5As Matsuyama (2007, 2008) points out, there are several causes to justify the borrow-
ing constraints from microeconomic literature (see Tirole 2006). Here, we do not get into
the details about which ones are more appropriate.
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where c0t is consumption of workers at date t, and 
0 is the subjective discount
factor of workers. We assume 0 < : This assumption ensures that in
equilibrium workers will not choose to lend.
Each worker chooses consumption, and the amount of borrowing to maxi-
mize (6) subject to the ow of funds constraint and the borrowing constraint.
c0t = wt   rt 1b0t 1 + b0t; (7)
rtb
0
t  0; (8)
where wt and b0t are the wage rate and the borrowing of the worker at date t.
There is a competitive nal goods market. Production function of a
representative rm is
Yt = AK
0;
t N
1 
t
k1 t ; (9)
where A is productivity, and Yt is output of the representative rm at date t:6
K 0t and Nt are capital and labor inputs of the rm at date t. kt is per-labor
capital of this economy at date t, capturing the positive externality in the
sense of Romer (1986).
Each rm chooses capital and labor inputs to maximize its prot, given
the relative price of capital to consumption goods, qt, the wage rate, wt, and
the externality, kt. Considering the equilibrium of k0t = kt; we obtain yt =
Ak0t; where k
0
t; and yt are per-labor capital and output of the rm. Because
the workers population is one, the aggregate capital input and output equal
per-labor capital and output. Competitive factor prices produce
qt = A; wt = A(1  )k0t: (10)
Let us denote aggregate consumption of H-entrepreneurs, L-entrepreneurs,
and workers at date t as CHt ; C
L
t ; and C
0
t. Similarly, let Z
H
t ; Z
L
t ; B
H
t ; B
L
t ; and
B0t be aggregate investment, and the amount of borrowing of each type. Then,
the market clearing for goods, credit, and capital are
CHt + C
L
t + C
0
t + Z
H
t + Z
L
t = Yt; (11)
6Here, we suppose that each rm is operated by workers. Since the net prot of each
rm is zero in equilibrium, the ow of funds constraint of the workers does not change,
and is the same as (7).
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BHt +B
L
t +B
0
t = 0; (12)
k0t = Kt; (13)
where Kt is the aggregate capital stock produced by the entrepreneurs at
date t.
2.1 Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium is dened as a set of prices frt; qt; wtg1t=0 and
quantities

ct; c
0
t; bt; b
0
t; zt; C
H
t ; C
L
t ; C
0
t; B
H
t ; B
L
t ; B
0
t; Z
H
t ; Z
L
t ; K
0
t; Kt; Yt
	1
t=0
which
satises the conditions that (i) each entrepreneur and worker maximizes util-
ity, and each rm maximizes its prot, and (ii) the market for goods, la-
bor, credit, and capital all clear. Because there is no shock except for the
idiosyncratic shocks to the state of the entrepreneurs, there is no aggregate
uncertainty, and the agents have perfect foresight about future prices and
aggregate quantities in the equilibrium.
We are now in a position to characterize equilibrium behavior of entre-
preneurs. Let us consider the case where  is lower than 1 (1 is dened
later in Proposition 1. We use a method of guess-and verify here.). If  is
lower than 1, in the neighborhood of the steady state, the real interest rate
equals the rate of return on low protable investment (This can be veried
in Proposition 1.). That is, we have
rt = q
L: (14)
And so, H-entrepreneurs prefer high protable investment with maximum
leverage. The borrowing constraint of H-entrepreneurs binds because the rate
of return on their investment is greater than the real interest rate. Since the
utility function is log, they consume a fraction (1   ) of the net worth,
ct = (1   )(qkt   rt 1bt 1). Then, by using (4), and (5), the investment
function of H-entrepreneurs becomes
zt =
(qkt   rt 1bt 1)
1  q
H
rt
: (15)
The numerator of (15) is the required down payment for unit investment.
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From (15), we see that the investment equals the leverage, 1=

1  (qH=rt)

times savings, (qkt   rt 1bt 1). The leverage is greater than one, and in-
creases with : This implies that when  is large, H-entrepreneurs can nance
more investment with smaller net worth. We also see that the sensitivity of
investment response to a change in the net worth becomes higher with .
This implies that even a small decline (increase) in the net worth can have a
large negative (positive) e¤ect on the investment.
Concerning workers, in the neighborhood of the steady state, the borrow-
ing constraint binds (This can be veried later in footnote 8.). Thus, they
consume all the income at every date, c0t = wt: From this behavior of workers,
credit market equilibrium, (12) becomes
BHt +B
L
t = 0: (16)
To L-entrepreneurs, they are indi¤erent between lending and investing
by themselves because the real interest rate is the same as the return on
their investment. Their saving rate is also a fraction  of their net worth.
Then, the aggregate lending and investment of them are determined by goods
market clearing condition, (11).
Since consumption, debt and investment are linear functions of the net
worth, we can aggregate across agents to nd the law of motion of the ag-
gregate capital:
Kt+1 = K
H
t+1 +K
L
t+1 = 
H E
H
t
1  q
H
rt
+ L
0BB@Yt   EHt
1  q
H
rt
1CCA
=

1 +

H   L
L   H

st

ALKt; (17)
whereKHt+1 andK
L
t+1 are the aggregate capital stock produced by H-entrepreneurs
and L-entrepreneurs at date t+1, respectively. EHt is the aggregate net worth
of H-entrepreneurs, and st  EHt =Yt is their net worth share against the ag-
gregate net worth of all entrepreneurs. Since Yt = AKt holds in equilibrium,
and from (17), economic growth rate becomes
gt+1  Yt+1
Yt
=

1 +

H   L
L   H

st

AL: (18)
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From (18), once st is determined, economic growth rate is also determined.
(18) implies that economic growth rate increases with nancial development.
Intuitively, when nancial development improves, the borrowing constraint
of H-entrepreneurs becomes relaxed. In the credit market, more credit can be
allocated to high protable investment projects, which promotes capital ac-
cumulation, and eventually economic growth. As in a traditional endogenous
growth setting, capital accumulation is the engine of economic growth.
The movement of the aggregate net worth of H-entrepreneurs evolves
according to
EHt = p(qtK
H
t   rt 1BHt 1) +X(1  p)(qtKLt   rt 1BLt 1): (19)
The rst term of (19) represents the aggregate net worth of the entre-
preneurs who continue to have high protable investment from the previous
period. The second term represents the aggregate net worth of the entrepre-
neurs who switch from the state of having only low protable investment to
the state of having high protable investment. By using (18) and (19), we
can derive the law of motion of the net worth share of H-entrepreneurs:
st+1 =
p
H(1  )
L   H st +X(1  p)(1  st)
1 +
H   L
L   H st
 (st; ): (20)
The dynamic evolution of the economy is characterized by the recursive
equilibrium: (wt; Kt+1; Yt+1; gt+1; st+1; ) that satises (10), (13), (17), (18),
and (20) as functions of the state variables (Kt; Yt; st):
2.2 Steady State Equilibrium
The stationary equilibrium of this economy depends upon the degree of -
nancial development. That is, we have the following proposition (Proof is in
Appendix 1).
Proposition 1 There are three stages of nancial development, correspond-
ing to three di¤erent values of . The characteristics of each region are as
follows:
(a) Region 1: 0   < 1  (1  p)=

H=L   p+X(1  p) : Since the
real interest rate equals the rate of return on low protable investment, the
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borrowing constraint of H-entrepreneurs binds. Both H-and L-entrepreneurs
produce capital. The steady state values of g; s; and r satisfy
g =

1 +

H   L
L   H

s

AL; s = (s; ); r = AL: (21)
(b) Region 2: 1   < 2  1=(1 +X): Since the real interest rate takes
the value of r 2 AL; AH, the borrowing constraint of H-entrepreneurs
binds, and they produce capital. However, L-entrepreneurs do not produce
capital because the real interest rate is greater than the rate of return on their
investment. The steady state values satisfy
g = AH ; s = p(1  ) +X(1  p); r = A
H
(1  p)= + p X(1  p) :
(22)
(c) Region 3: 2    1: Since the real interest equals the rate of return
on high protable investment, the borrowing constraint of H-entrepreneurs
does not bind. Only H-entrepreneurs produce capital. The steady state values
satisfy
g = AH ; s =
X
1 +X
; r = AH : (23)
In region 1 where nancial development is relatively low, the nancial
system can not transfer enough savings to high protable investment be-
cause of agency problems. In the credit markets, some of the savings ow to
low protable investment because they are not subject to agency frictions.
In this region, as nancial development improves, more credit is allocated to
high protable investment. This improvement of credit allocation promotes
capital accumulation, the wage rate, and economic growth. However, in this
region the real interest rate is unchanged. This property is similar to Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981) model. In their model, when information asymmetry is
large, the real interest rate is insensitive, and becomes constant where the
banks prot is maximized. Similarly, in our model, when nancial develop-
ment is low, the real interest rate is sticky.
In region 2 where nancial development is high, but not so high, the
situation changes. As nancial markets develop, the real interest rate starts
rising because of the tightness in the credit market, and all the savings are
allocated to high protable investment, even though the borrowing constraint
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still binds for H-entrepreneurs. Only H-entrepreneurs produce capital. As a
result, the growth rate of the economy becomes constant, and independent
of . This implies that once the nancial system is developed to some degree,
it can transfer enough purchasing power to the entrepreneurs who have high
protable investment from the entrepreneurs who have only low protable
investment. In addition, in region 1 and 2, since the interest rate is lower
than the rate of return on H-entrepreneursinvestment, income distribution
is di¤erent between H-and L-entrepreneurs.
When nancial markets grow further, and reaches region 3, the real in-
terest rate becomes equal to the rate of return on high protable investment.
Therefore, the borrowing constraint for H-entrepreneurs no longer binds. As
in region 2, the nancial system can allocate all the savings to only high
protable investment. Moreover, since H-and L-entrepreneurs earn the same
rate of return, there is no di¤erence in income distribution.7
2.3 Dynamics
Now, let us look at how this economy responds to an unexpected shock
to productivity. Suppose that at date    1 the economy is in region 1,
and in the steady state: g 1 = g; s 1 = s and r 1 = r. There is
then an unexpected shock to productivity at date  : A declines by "; and
becomes A = A(1  "): However, the shock is known to be temporary. The
productivity at date +1 and thereafter returns to A: Here since we consider
a negative shock, we set " to be positive.
Following Kocherlakota (2000), we measure nancial amplication (volatil-
ity) of a downward shock " to be how far economic growth rate from  to
 + 1 jumps down from the steady-state growth rate through the borrowing
constraint. Considering q = A(1   ") and A = A(1   "); from (18) and
(19), we obtain
Amplication  dg+1
d"
j"=0 =

H   L
L   H

ds
d"
j"=0| {z }
	
AL < 0: (24)
7In our model, in the neighborhood of the steady state equilibrium, the borrowing
constraint of workers binds in all three regions because 0rt=gt+1 < 1 holds. This can be
veried by embedding (21), (22), and (23) into the inequality.
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Since H-entrepreneurs have a net debt in the aggregate, and debts repay-
ment does not change by this shock, the net worth share of H-entrepreneurs
decreases at date  (ds
d"
< 0). Because the adjustment of the real interest rate
does not work well in region 1, their borrowing constraint becomes tightened.
As a result, they are forced to cut back on their investment: Moreover, these
balance sheet e¤ects cause more credit to ow to the investment with less
agency frictions. What is called ight to quality occurs. Through these
e¤ects, less capital is produced at date  + 1, so that economic growth rate
at date  + 1 jumps down from the steady state growth rate.
Now, we are in a position to examine whether nancial development ac-
celerates or dampens these nancial amplication e¤ects.
First, lets check region 1. By di¤erentiating (24) with respect to ; we
obtain
@2g+1
@@"
j"=0 = @
@

H   L
L   H

| {z }

@s
@"
j"=0| {z }
	
AL+

H   L
L   H

@2s
@@"
j"=0| {z }
	
AL < 0:
(25)
The rst term represents the sensitivity of the H-entrepreneursinvest-
ment response to a change in the net worth share. Since it becomes higher
with , with even a small decline in the net worth share, H-entrepreneurs are
forced to reduce their investment substantially. The second term represents
the degree of a decline in the net worth share. It says that the decline by
itself becomes larger with  (See Appendix 2). This implies that when 
is high, the leverage and debt/asset ratios of H-entrepreneurs also rise. In
such a situation, even a small negative productivity shock can cause a large
decline in the net worth share. Taken together, H-entrepreneurs have to make
deeper cuts in their investment. Moreover, this causes a substantial credit
shift from the investment with agency frictions to the one with less agency
frictions. That is, balance sheet e¤ects and ight to quality are signicant.
Hence, in region 1, nancial development accelerates nancial amplication
e¤ects, thereby leading to increased macroeconomic volatility.
Once the economy enters region 2, the situation changes dramatically.
The shock absorbing e¤ects start operating through the adjustment of the
real interest rate. This weakens the balance sheet e¤ects, and prevents ight
to quality.
In order to clarify this point, lets look at how the real interest rate
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responds to this shock. In region 2, the equilibrium in the credit market at
date  becomes
s
1  q+1
H
r
= 1: (26)
And then, the economic growth rate from  to  + 1 is
g+1 =
Y+1
Y
= AH
s
1  q+1
H
r
: (27)
By embeding (26) into (27), we obtain
g+1 = A
H: (28)
From (28), we see that the economic growth rate from  to  + 1 is not
a¤ected by the shock. Why is the growth rate independent of the shock?
In order to make this point clear, lets look at how the net worth share of
H-entrepreneurs changes by this shock.
The aggregate net worth of H-entrepreneurs and the aggregate output at
date  follow
EH = p

A(1  ")KH   r 1BH 1

) +X(1  p)r 1BH 1; (29)
Y = A(1  ")HY 1: (30)
From (29) and (30), the net worth share of H-entrepreneurs at date  follows
s =
p(1     ") +X(1  p)
1  " : (31)
And so, by using (26) and (31), we obtain an expression for the equilib-
rium interest rate at date  :
r =
AH(1  ")
(1  p)(1  ") + [p X(1  p)]  : (32)
From (32), we observe that the real interest rate declines at the time of
the shock. Intuitively, following the shock, the borrowing constraint becomes
tightened as in region 1. And then, the investment function is shifted to the
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left. However, in region 2, together with this shift, the real interest rate
goes down in the credit market. This decline in the real interest rate in
turn relaxes the borrowing constraint, thereby weakening the balance sheet
e¤ects and preventing ight to quality. As a result, nancial amplication
is dampened. This implies that once nancial development passes a certain
degree, the adjustment of the real interest rate recovers, so that even if the
shock hit the economy, all the credit ow only to high protable investment.
Therefore, the shock does not get amplied. Financial development leads to
macroeconomic stability.
When nancial development reaches region 3, even with the shock, the
nancial system can transfer enough purchasing power to those who have high
productive investment from those who have only low protable investment
without the adjustment of the real interest rate. The real interest rate at
date  , AH and the growth rate from  to  + 1, AH are independent
of the shock. So, no nancial amplication occurs.
Here we should add remarks about the di¤erence between Kiyotaki (1998)
and ours. Although Kiyotaki does not explicitly mention it, Kiyotakis analy-
sis implicitly assumes a certain low ; which is within region 1 in this paper,
and then, keeping the  xed, Kiyotaki examines how amplication occurs.
On the other hand, our paper analyzes whether or not the size of amplica-
tion by itself increases or decreases together with  not only in low  region,
but also high  region.
The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 2 The relationship between nancial development and nan-
cial amplication is non-monotone: nancial amplication initially increases
with nancial development (in region 1) and later falls down (in region 2 and
3).
This non-monotonicity is consistent with empirical studies. For exam-
ple, Easterly et al. (2000) demonstrate that the relation between nancial
development and growth volatility is non-monotone. They show that while
developed nancial systems o¤er oppurtunities for stabilization, they may
also imply higher leverage of rms and thus more risks and less stability. A
recent study by Kunieda (2008) also show empirically that the relation is
hump-shaped, i.e., in early stages of nancial development, as the nancial
sector develops in an economy, it becomes highly volatile. However, as the
nancial sector matures further, the volatility starts to reduce once again.
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Based on the above analysis, we might be able to explain why we observe
two conicting views. The traditional view might discuss region 1-2 or 2
where nancial markets are well developed. Indeed, in Arrow-Debreu econ-
omy where there is no agency friction in the credit market,  is equal to one.
On the other hand, the new view might discuss region 1-1 where nancial
development is not so high, and there are agency frictions to some degree in
nancial markets. In this sense, the discrepancy between two views might
arise from the di¤erence in the degree of nancial development.8 We depict
this situation in Figure 1. In the Figure 1, we take  in horizontal axis, and
in vertical axis, we take the magnitude of amplication. It is shown that the
relation between  and the magnitude is non-monotone.
This non-monotonicity has impliciations for the relation between growth
and macroeconomic volatility. That is, in region 1-1, nancial development
causes economic growth. However, once negative productivity shocks hit the
economy, downward amplication is signicant since the economy is highly
leveraged. In this sense, there is a trade-o¤ between higher economic growth
and macroeconomic stability. But, once nancial development reaches region
1-2 or 2, both go together.
Moreover, our model may also have implications for asymmetric move-
ments of business uctuations. As Kocherlakota (2000) emphasizes, macro-
economics looks for an asymmetric amplication and propagation mechanism
that can turn small shocks to the economy into the business cycle uctua-
tions. Our model might deliver this. For example, if the economy is around
2; to positive productivity shocks, even though the borrowing constraint is
binding for the entrepreneurs, the economy will not respond upwardly be-
cause the interest rate will go up in the credit market, which generates shock
cushioning e¤ects. On the other hand, to negative productivity shocks, it
8You may wonder why large downward amplication occurs repeatedly in the real
economy where nancial development keeps increasing over time, even though our model
suggests that nancial amplication eventually becomes small in high  region. Here is
one interpretation from this model. In this model, the important factor which a¤ects the
size of nancial amplication is ; which is put on higher protable investment, not on
the storage technology with low returns. Considering this point, think about the case
where the existing low technology with  disappper, and new investment opportunities
with higher protability than the existing  come into the economy. In such a situation,
the  which is put on those new investment projects matters. If the  is low, the economy
will get into region 1 again even if it was in region 2 or 3 before. In the real economy, this
process might repeats itself.
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will react downwardly because the interest rate does not adjust.9
Proposition 3 if the level of nancial development is around 1; business
uctuations are asymmetric.
3 Conclusion
This paper develops a macroeconomic model of credit market imperfections
with heterogeneous agents in order to investigate whether nancial devel-
opment exacerbates or dampens nancial amplication. In our framework,
nancial development produces two competing forces. One is the e¤ect which
accelerates amplication by strengthening balance sheet e¤ects. The other
is the e¤ect which dampens amplication, we call shock cushioning e¤ects.
Depending on which of these dominates, whether nancial development ex-
acerbates or weakens nancial propagation is determined. Moreover, the
balance between these two conicting e¤ects changes according to the level
of nancial development.
We show that in a low level of nancial development, while shock cush-
ioning e¤ects do not work well, nancial development enhances balance sheet
e¤ects through raising leverage, thereby accelerating nancial amplication.
However, once the level of development passes a certain degree, nancial de-
velopment generates shock cushioning e¤ects, which in turn weakens balance
sheet e¤ects, thereby dampening nancial amplication. Hence, the relation
between nancial development and nancial amplication is non-monotone:
nancial amplication initially increases with nancial development and later
falls down.
As future research, the next step would be that we want to develop quan-
titative assessment into the relation between the development of nancial
markets and volatility of the economy. Another step would be to consider
the welfare cost of volatility in a heterogeneous agents model with aggregate
uncertainty. These directions will be promising.
9Here we consider small shocks. However, if we think about relatively large productivity
shocks, business uctuations may become asymmetric, even if the economy is far from 2.
In the case with relatively large positive shocks, positive propagation occurs, but the
degree of it is weakened because the adjustment of the interest rate works. However, to
the negative shocks, because the adjustment does not work, the economy experiences large
downward propagation.
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Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 1
In order to verify that (14) holds in equilibrium, we only need to check
that the entrepreneurs with low prot investment invest positive amounts of
goods:
ZLt = Yt
0BB@1  st
1  
H
L
1CCA : (33)
Using (20), we nd that (33) becomes positive in the neighborhood of the
steady state if, and only if  is lower than 1:
Moreover, from (22); if  < 1=(1+X); then r < AH : That is, the real
interest rate is lower than the marginal productivity of the entrepreneurs with
high prot investment. Thus, the borrowing constraint for H-entrepreneurs
binds. For L-entrepreneurs, since the real interest rate is greater than the
rate of return on their investment, they would prefer lending to investing by
themselves.
We also see that if  = 1=(1+X); then r = AH : Thus, the borrowing
constraint for H-entrepreneurs no longer binds. Furthermore, If  is greater
than 1=(1 + X); then for the credit market to clear, the real interest rate
has to equal AH (If the real interest rate is greater than AH ; nobody is
willing to borrow in the credit markets. This can not be an equilibrium.).
Appendix 2
By embedding q = A(1   ") and A = A(1   ") into (18) and (19), and
di¤erentiating s with respect to ", we obtain
@s
@
j"=0 = [p X(1  p)]  
Hs
L   H + (H L)s < 0: (34)
And then, by using (34), we have
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@2s
@@
j"=0 = [p X(1  p)]H
 @s

@
(L   H)  Ls   (H   L)s2
[L   H + (H   L)s]2 < 0:
(35)
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